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December 17, 1962

NOTES FOR MR. EARMAN

Note bottom of Page 12, I know of only one instance where support can be found for the last sentence, bottom of page, and that is the action of DDI on October 3rd to COMOR. At the meetings of October 4th and 9th, at which time the October 14th flight was agreed upon, flight plan was directed over the most advanced two SAM sites and there was no statement made by Colonel Steakley or Scoville that the purpose was to pass over a known or suspected MRBM site. I feel it would be erroneous to give the impression this flight went where it went because we suspected MRBMs were there. This was simply not the case.

Note numbered paragraph 3, page 14. [] was set up for an entirely different purpose than the Soviet build-up and the introduction of missiles. One would think otherwise from reading this report. I think this paragraph should be rewritten; in fact I think the paragraph might deal briefly with the MONGOOSE activities and project, avoiding the name but explaining the broad purposes of it which were quite different than establishing facts on the Soviet build-up because when MONGOOSE was started, the idea was to get all the facts necessary to knock off Castro. There was no serious concern about Soviet build-up at that time.

25X1

Paragraph on page 17 at the bottom of the page you refer to policy considerations as limiting factors in overhead reconnaissance. This might be spelled out somewhat because I'm sure it will come up for discussion and your brief treatment gives me the impression that we are obscuring the fact that there were policy decisions based on concern over possible contact with SAM sites and thus the creation of a U-2 incident.

Note bottom of Page 22 and top of Page 23. Irrespective of the content of the report, I would like to see the support for this statement.

25X1

I question statement on the bottom of Page 35 and top of Page 36. As I recall this particular report was based on an observation on September 12th, a report on September 19th, and this apparently was not disseminated until October 2nd. I have a question in my mind which was not resolved by this report as to the entire process on the total dissemination with respect to priorities and sensitivity of special information. It seems to me the entire period of September 12th or September 19th to October 2nd on a matter of this sensitivity and importance is a very long time indeed. The report does not deal with this.

I had trouble with paragraph 28 on Page 38 for reasons previously mentioned.

Note paragraph 11, bottom of page 58. Do we have any specific information as to exactly what CIA proposed at this meeting of the Special Group for the two flights which were "considered" for September? With reference to chronology to overflights covered in Section 10, starting on page 55 and carrying through to page 72, I am troubled about the following and the report does not answer my questions nor questions which are bound to arise in the minds of the Killian Board and others. One, what happened at the Special Group meeting on August 30th in which the September CIA overflight program was approved? What was submitted by CIA? And what was approved by the Special Group? Two, this raises a question of why and at what point did the Special Group change its procedure with respect to Cuban overflights from the procedure of many months in which they merely approved two overflights per month, permitting CIA and COMOR to work out flight plans and so forth, to a new procedure in which CIA (for some unexplained reason) brought in a flight plan which was substantially modified for reasons explained. I do not have an explanation of this and I'd like to know where this change in procedure came from, by whose order, and under what circumstances. Three, on Page 65, did CIA's decision it would only fly when there was less than a 25% overcast constitute a new and different approach to the "go-no-go" question and if so, who ordered this, and why. Four, I take exception to paragraph 30 on page 69. While I think the question was raised as to whether there was a restriction, actions speak for themselves. In the first place, on October 4th, it became apparent that there had been no coverage of Western Cuba for 40 days; moreover

the program of filing flight plans with the Special Group had developed and that is not clearly understood. Also at the October 4th meeting there was a long discussion as to whether [redacted]

[redacted] could not do the job. This was seriously considered and one of the ideas which Steakley and Scoville were asked to consider in preparing plans for the October 9th meeting, hence I would say there are circumstantial evidences, and an abundance of them, that definite restrictions had been placed on U-2 coverage of Cuba and furthermore that CIA had been remiss in proposing something less than complete coverage, having been influenced by the existing attitude from which they could conclude that complete overflights, if proposed, would not be approved.

The October 5th memorandum of COMOR, on pages 69 and 70, is new to me. It was not brought to my attention. When was it received by Scoville's U-2 planners and why was it not used in planning the Oct. 7th flight? Finally, as I have said before, at the October 4th and Oct. 9th meetings of the Special Group, the only consideration on which the October 14th flight was programmed was to direct the flight over the two most advanced SAM sites in Cuba and the decision was reached, and recommendation made to higher authority, that if this flight did not light up the SAMs, then we could conclude they were not operational and could proceed with two or more flights over Western Cuba in order to develop a mosaic of the island. Neither Colonel Steakley nor anyone else mentioned (to my recollection or knowledge) information in their hands concerning MRBM sites in the particular location of this flight. The DIA directive to COMOR of October 3rd, which in retrospect was very astute, was not brought to the attention of the Special Group on October 4th or October 9th, to my knowledge.

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